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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
Charles Steele was indicted in April 1996 for mail fraud 
stemming from a scheme to overbill his lawfirm's clients 
and for obstruction of justice for submitting alter ed 
documents in response to a March 15, 1994 grand jury 
subpoena. Following an eight-day jury trial, Steele was 
found guilty of mail fraud and four of five obstruction 
counts. The District Court sentenced Steele to 33 months 
imprisonment, three years of supervised r elease, and 
restitution. Steele appealed to this Court, and we affirmed 
his conviction. United States v. Steele, 135 F.3d 768 (3d 
Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, (unpublished 1/7/98), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2356, reh'g denied , 119 S.Ct. 287 
(1998). 
 
On January 13, 1999, Steele filed a motion to vacate his 
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. He contended that 
the evidence supporting the obstruction of justice counts 
was insufficient to meet the standard set forth in United 
States v. Nelson, 852 F.2d 706 (3d Cir . 1988), and that his 
attorney had provided ineffective assistance in not making 
an argument based on Nelson at trial. The basis of Steele's 
claim was that the government did not pr ove that the 
March 15 subpoena had been issued as part of an actual 
grand jury investigation. The District Court denied the 
motion, holding that the sufficiency of the evidence had 
previously been litigated. As to the inef fective assistance 
claim, the Court noted that trial counsel had moved to 
dismiss the obstruction charge citing, inter alia, Nelson. The 
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Court stated that Steele's counsel had raised the issue in a 
trial brief, in a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, before and 
at the charge conference, and on appeal. 
 
The District Court denied Steele's request for a certificate 
of appealability, but this Court granted the r equest and 
certified for appeal two questions: "(1) whether appellant is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his section 2255 
motion" in light of Nelson's mandate that a defendant "be 
afforded an opportunity to question whether the United 
States Attorney secured the subpoena in furtherance of a 
then present contemplation that the subpoenaed evidence 
would be presented to a grand jury," and"(2) if so, and if 
the facts in this case ultimately show that the subpoena 
was not secured in furtherance of a then pr esent 
contemplation that the subpoenaed evidence would be 
presented to a grand jury, whether appellant is`actually 
innocent' of the four counts of obstruction of justice." App. 
III at 731. It is those questions only which we answer.1 
Because we conclude that the motion, files, and r ecord of 
the case conclusively show that the subpoena at issue was 
"secured in furtherance of a then pr esent contemplation 
that the subpoenaed evidence would be presented to a 
grand jury," Steele is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 
on his S 2255 motion. See United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 
39, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1992). We, thus, answer the first 
question in the negative and do not reach the second. 
 
A grand jury investigation can be a pending judicial 
proceeding for purposes of 18 U.S.C. S 1503, but "[n]ot 
every investigation in which grand jury subpoenas ar e used 
ripens into a pending grand jury investigation." Nelson, 852 
F.2d at 710. As we explained in Nelson , grand jury 
subpoenas often are issued by Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government has argued, among other things, that certification 
should not have been granted and that the doctrine of law of the case 
prohibits reconsideration of the Nelson issue. Without pausing to decide 
whether the government is right or wrong as to one or both of its 
arguments, we will move immediately to the certified questions. We note 
that in considering these questions, we need not consider whether Steele 
raised his specific claim in haec verba at trial or on appeal and, if not, 
whether he has shown the cause and prejudice r equired in the 
traditional S 2255 case for failing to do so. 
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acting under Fed. Rule Crim. Pro. 17(a) without meaningful 
judicial oversight. Subpoenas can, therefor e, be used to 
facilitate a prosecutor's or other law enfor cement agency's 
investigation rather than the grand jury's investigation. Id. 
at 710. On the other hand, rigid rules marking the start of 
a grand jury investigation "can be easily cir cumvented by 
the government and offer the guilty a sanctuary among 
empty technicalities." Id. (quotation omitted). Therefore, we 
have "counselled a case by case inquiry into whether the 
subpoenas were issued in furtherance of an actual grand 
jury investigation, i.e., whether they were issued `to secure 
a presently contemplated presentation of evidence before 
the grand jury.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Walasek, 527 
F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
 
By definition, the rejection of rigid rules leaves courts 
with a rather vague standard by which to deter mine 
whether a grand jury investigation was pending at the 
relevant time. At a minimum, S 1503 r equires that a grand 
jury be sitting at the time the subpoena issues, although 
the mere existence of a potentially unr elated grand jury 
sitting in the same district is not enough. United States v. 
Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 1999). No formal act is 
required to establish a pending investigation, however. 
Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678. Indeed, this Court has rejected 
suggestions "that an investigation be deemed pending only 
if (1) the grand jury actually hears testimony, (2) the grand 
jury plays an active role in the decision to issue the 
subpoena, or (3) the grand jury is aware of the subpoena at 
the time of the alleged obstruction of justice." Nelson, 852 
F.2d at 710 (citations and quotations omitted). "[A]dding 
such a gloss to the test laid down in Walasek would 
frustrate the purpose of the obstruction of justice statute." 
United States v. Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
The evidence before the trial jury showed that Steele 
produced documents which were received by the grand jury 
and signed for by the grand jury deputy foreperson about 
one month after the issuance of the March 15 subpoena. 
One of the documents in evidence is the receipt signed by 
the deputy foreperson, which states that the grand jury was 
empaneled on March 15, 1994, the same date the 
subpoena was issued. The subpoena gave Steele's lawfirm 
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the option to send a representative to appear personally 
before the grand jury to present the r ecords. Steele's 
partner, Matthew Hoffman, waived that right in an affidavit 
admitted into evidence. Moreover, Julia Rhyner, Steele's 
secretary, testified at trial that postal inspectors interviewed 
her on February 17, 1994 and advised her that she would 
be a "witness" rather than a "defendant," indicating that the 
decision to prosecute Steele was contemplated before the 
issuance of the grand jury subpoena. 
 
Steele may be correct that none of these facts alone is 
enough. However, the facts together show that (1) a grand 
jury existed concurrently with the issuance of the subpoena 
and either had begun or was prepared to begin an 
investigation upon receipt of the evidence; (2) the grand 
jury would have been available for Steele, Hof fman or a 
representative of the firm to appear before in person had 
any of them so desired; (3) the evidence was, in fact, given 
to the grand jury and given in a timely fashion; and (4) 
there was a then-present contemplation not merely of 
presenting the subpoenaed evidence to the grand jury but 
of prosecution. This is more than enough to establish that 
the subpoena was issued as part of a grand jury 
investigation and is at least as much as was found 
sufficient in Nelson. Indeed, in Nelson, the subpoenaed 
evidence was not received by the grand jury for months, yet 
we held that "we cannot say that the subpoenas could not 
have been issued in furtherance of a present contemplation 
to present evidence to a grand jury." Nelson, 852 F.2d at 
711. 
 
One final note. To the extent Steele ar gues that Nelson 
stands for the proposition that every obstruction case 
requires testimony from the attor ney who issued the first 
subpoena, he is incorrect. Nelson actually states that: 
 
       A party on trial for obstruction of a grand jury 
       investigation alleged to have begun upon the issuance 
       of a grand jury subpoena must be affor ded an 
       opportunity to question whether the United States 
       Attorney or his or her representative secured the 
       subpoena in furtherance of a then present 
       contemplation that the subpoenaed evidence would be 
       presented to a grand jury. 
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Id. (emphasis added). Read in context, this passage from 
Nelson merely reiterates our r eluctance to establish some 
technicality as proof of the existence of a pending 
proceeding. We specified that a defendant must be allowed 
to question "whether" the Assistant U.S. Attor ney 
contemplated presentation to a grand jury, not that the 
defendant must be able to actually question the Assistant 
himself or herself. 
 
Given that we find, as a matter of law, that the evidence 
warrants rejection of Steele's Nelson claim, we also reject 
his suggestion that the jury instructions for eclosed inquiry 
into whether the government met its Nelson  burden. We 
find, in any event, that they did no such thing. 
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